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Abstract 
This study examines a relationship between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of the top 
five executive directors’ total compensation that is captured by CEO - and firm value in the 
UK. CPS reflects the relative importance of CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is 
able to extract rents. CPS may also alter effectiveness of board performance by influencing 
cooperation and cohesiveness among its members. Using a large sample of UK-listed 
companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, we document evidence supporting a negative 
relationship between CPS and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that high CPS is associated with agency problems, and is likely 
to impact negatively on the executive team’s spirit and motivation. Our results have major 
implications for the on-going debate on how to reform executive remuneration, and highlight 
the importance of considering remuneration issues at the board level, supporting the 
principles of UK Corporate Governance Code (2010).  
 
 
JEL classification: G32, G35, G38, J33, L29 
Key words: executive compensation, CEO compensation, corporate governance, agency 
problem, firm performance.  
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1. Introduction  
Corporate scandals about ‘fat cats' compensation packages in Britain[1] are a timely reminder 
that pay-performance problem in the UK requires further attention. Shortcomings in 
regulation of compensation-related issues have been addressed by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2010 (The Code), with the particular attention being paid to the importance 
of establishing definite connections between director’s remuneration and firm 
performance[2]. In September 2013, the UK Government also introduced a mandatory “say 
on pay” legislation allowing firm's shareholders to vote on the remuneration of executives. 
In this study, we aim to shed additional light on the link between executives’ 
compensation and a firm performance in the UK context. In particular, we investigate 
whether pay inequality between CEO and top executives affects performance of British 
companies. We hypothesize that fraction of aggregate compensation of top-five managers 
captured by the CEO personally (the CPS) impacts board effectiveness, which in turn affects 
firm outcomes. In our analysis, we controls for several corporate governance characteristics 
(board composition, board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, and board busyness) and for 
various firm characteristics (company age, company size, ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets, and leverage). We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, comprising 1,401 firms and 6,959 firm-year observations over the 1997 to 
2010 time period. Our empirical methodology includes estimation of panel data by using 
various fixed effects models.  
                                                          
i. See The Guardian: “David Cameron to curb 'fat cat' pay with people power”`, 7th January, 2012, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay. "We've got 
to deal with the merry-go-round where there are too many cases of remuneration committee members 
sitting on each other's boards, patting each other's backs and handing out each other's pay rises," he 
said. "We need to redefine the word 'fair'. We need to try to give people a sense that we have a vision at 
the end of this, of a fairer, better economy, a fairer, better society, where if you work hard and do the 
right thing you get rewarded” 
ii. Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: “levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, 
retain, and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company 
should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive 
directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance.” (The UK Corporate Governance Code, June 2010: p.22). 
3 
 
We find consistent support for the proposition that higher CPS is associated with lower 
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our results rule out the optimal contracting hypothesis, 
which suggests that high CPS is determined deliberately by a company as the motivation 
incentive (to motivate CEO as well as top executive directors) with the view to improve firm 
outcomes. However, the results strongly support the agency perspective, suggesting that high 
CPS level could be due to the agency problem in firm with powerful and influential CEO. In 
addition, high CPS could demotivate those managers nearest to the CEO, destroy team 
cooperation within the board room, and lead to poor board and thus firm performance (via the 
social comparison effect, inherent to British boards[3]). Our results indicate that CPS can 
provide a useful tool for research on firm performance, and that its relation with the value of 
firms is an important issue to be considered in the UK context.   
Our study relates to different bodies of literature. First, there is clear evidence from 
the literature that proportion of compensation received by CEO has been trending up over 
time (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005; Frydman and Saks, 2010; Forbes et 
al., 2014 among others). We add to this stream by investigating the relationship between CPS 
and firm performance in the UK context. Second, we extend the literature analysing the 
association between different corporate governance characteristics and Tobin’s Q (see 
Yermack, 1996; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009 
among others). We contribute to this literature by considering another aspect of governance 
arrangements, the CPS, and its impact on firm performance. Finally, our work enhances the 
literature that analyses different CEO qualities and characteristics and their effects on firm 
outcomes. We highlight CPS as an important feature, which can provide additional insights 
into understanding of CEO compensation – firm performance link.  
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. We provide a theoretical background 
                                                          
iii. See Zalewska (2014a,b) for detailed discussion of the UK board mechanisms and structures.  
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and develop our hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 contains the sample description and 
summary statistics. Section 4 outlines the methodology used for the analysis. Section 5 
examines the relationship between CPS and firm value. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Remuneration Disparity and Firm Performance 
Academic literature suggests that pay difference within top management has important 
consequences for functional efficiency of the management team and, subsequently, on firm 
performance (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007; Lee et al., 
2008; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Fridman and Saks, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Zalewska, 
2014a; Forbes et al, 2014 among others). Even though researchers confirm existence of the 
relationship between pay inequality and firm performance, there is a disagreement regarding 
the nature of this relationship. Lazer and Roshen (1981), Rosen (1986), Eriksson (1999), 
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001), DeVaro (2006a, 2006b), Lee et al. (2008), Kale et al.  
(2009), Rankin and Sayre (2011) find that pay disparity has a positive effect on company 
performance. On the other side, Hayward and Hambrick (1997), Bloom and Michel (2002), 
Carpenter and Sanders (2002), Siegel and Hambrick (2005), Fredrickson et al.  (2010), 
Bebchuk et al. (2011), Zalewska (2014a), report that a wide remuneration gap among 
executives affects firm outcomes in a negative way. 
Despite the growing body of literature on executives’ remuneration disparity, there are 
only a handful of studies examining its effect on firm performance using UK data. Correa and 
Lel (2014) investigate the effect of “say on pay” law on executive compensation, CPS and 
firm value using a large cross-country sample from 39 countries including the UK. They find 
that CEO pay – firm performance links become stronger when “say on pay” laws are 
implemented, and that companies that previously had greater CPS, experience significant 
performance improvements. These findings imply a negative correlation between CPS and 
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firm outcomes, and are consistent with results from previous research (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 
2011). Zalewska (2014a) analyses the link between remuneration dispersion at executive 
board level and firm performance using a large sample of British companies. She also unveils 
a negative relationship between remuneration dispersion and performance. Forbes et al.  
(2014) criticise CPS as a valuable measure to be used in the analyses of pay disparity –
corporate performance relationship, and introduces a Gini coefficient as an alternative.  
 
2.2. Optimal Contracting  
Under the optimal contracting theory, CEO compensation is determined by a complex set of 
factors and reflects CEO talent, ability, experience, and career concerns. Optimal 
compensation reflects the extent to which companies are willing to offer ‘tournament’ 
incentives to top executives other than a CEO. Optimal contracting arguments (See Edmans 
and Gabaix, 2011 for review) suggest that high CEO pay - relative to pay of other top 
executives - is determined deliberately by companies as motivation incentive with the view to 
improve firm outcomes. In a typical rank order tournament framework, the best performer is 
promoted to the next level in the managerial hierarchy. The promotion guarantees a higher 
pay level, so the framework motivates executive directors to exert greater efforts and perform 
better. Earlier empirical research on labour economics (e.g., Bognanno, 2001), and the most 
recent research on corporate finance (e.g., Kale et al. , 2009) use the compensation gap 
between  CEO and lower-rung executives as a measure of tournament incentives. Lee et al.  
(2008) and Kale et al. (2009), among others, find tournament incentives to be an important 
mechanism in motivating managers.  
 Based on the above, we hypothesize that companies intentionally decide to set high CPSs 
to motivate their CEOs and top executives other than CEOs.  CEO is motivated to be a good 
steward and make every effort to ensure successful company performance, because he/she 
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takes care about his/her own reputation (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992); in turn, top executives, 
other than CEO, are also motivated to perform better while competing for the CEO position. 
This leads us to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: CPS is positively associated with firm value.  
 
2.3. Social Comparison Perspective 
In contrast to the optimal contracting theory, there is a very strong opposing view on the 
effects that high remuneration disparity has on a firm value. Fong et al. (2010) argue that 
compensation should reflect a manager’s ability, but at the same time should not lay the 
foundation for strong feelings of inequality/injustice among peers on the labour market. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) demonstrate that tournament mechanisms within the executive 
team can produce negative incentives for top executives other than CEO. It is very unlikely 
that a company will benefit from the tournament framework if top executives who are 
competing for the CEO position refuse to cooperate and even might undermine their rivals. A 
wide gap between CEO compensation and compensation of top executives (the “prize size”) 
emphasises on the importance of the CEO as a “dominant player” (Bebchuk et al., 2011). 
Bebchuk et al. (2011) argues that it is beneficial to have a dominant player as he/she can 
guarantee clarity, steadiness and cost reduction of decision making process. On the other side, 
a large body of literature, starting with Shaw (1932), suggests that group decision making is 
superior to the individual decision making. Moreover, the dominant player approach can lead 
to resentment on the part of other members of the top executive team (Brill, 1993; Cook, 
1990). Hicks (1963) introduced the notion that large pay differences may have a negative 
impact on employees through feelings of inequity and it may lead to a weaker employees’ 
dedication increasing a dysfunctional conflict, which, in turn, “diminish the efficiency of the 
team” (Hicks, 1963: p. 334). Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1988) 
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and Levine (1991) build up on the earlier work of Hicks (1963) and argue that low pay 
differences may have positive effect on employees’ diligence and productiveness by creating 
well-balanced and efficient labour relations leading thereby to better outputs. Levine (1991) 
also demonstrates that lower level of pay dispersion leads into better employee cohesiveness 
and productivity[4]. Considering that UK boards are not strongly hierarchical and CEOs are 
not so powerful in Britain compared to their American colleagues (see Tom and Wright, 
2005; Aguilera et al., 2006), high CPS can impact negatively on team spirit and motivation, 
weakening board effectiveness. In accordance with the social comparison view[5], this can 
attenuate firm performance.  
High level of CPS also can be viewed as a sign of significant agency problems. CPS can 
indicate the extent to which a CEO uses his/her power and influence to serve his/her own 
interests (Bebchuk et al., 2011), captures a board and set up his/her own pay (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004). Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CEO pay slice (CPS) negatively affects firm 
performance, especially in firms with entrenched managers. 
Based on the above, we argue that CEO may be able to entrench, maximise his/her own 
power, and extract rents by securing higher than optimal compensation, regardless of his/her 
quality of service. A high CPS level may result in lower cohesion and less cooperation among 
board members, which negatively affects firm performance. This leads us to the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: CPS is negatively associated with firm value. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Data Description 
3.1. Sample Selection  
                                                          
iv. This argument is also consistent with research on cooperation in general economic situation (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1988; Lazear, 1989; van den Assem et al., 2012). 
v. The social comparison theory was introduced by Festinger (1957), and underlines equity theory 
oriented concerns (Adams, 1965). 
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For this study, we use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. We obtain firms’ financial and market information from Thompson Datastream, 
and corporate governance and directors’ compensation information from BoardEx. The 
sample period is from 1997 to 2010, and it includes all firms whose information is available 
from these two sources. The choice of year 1997 as the start year for our sample window is 
due to the limited availability of corporate governance data prior to this year. 
We merged the data from BoardEx and Thomson Datastream and ended up with 
unbalanced panel of 1,401 firms and 6,959 observations over the 1997 – 2010 time period. 
Our definition of CPS is marginally different from definition in Bebchuk et al.  (2011). 
British corporate boards are, on average smaller than American boards. Only 16% of our 
sample companies have five or more executive directors at the board level. We compute CPS 
as the fraction of the total compensation paid to a group of minimum two and maximum five 
top executives, that is received by the CEO. We use Tobin’s Q as a key measure of corporate 
performance.  We control for other potential determinants of firm value, found to be 
important in the previous studies (see Bebchuk et al., 2011; McNulty et.al., 2013; Zalewska, 
2014a; Forbes et al., 2014) and include firm size, company age, capital expenditures, and 
leverage in our model. We also collect information about the governance structure of each 
firm,  such as board size, board composition, board busyness, CEO tenure, CEO duality, 
whether the CEO is  insider or  outsider, i.e. was/was not an employee of the firm before 
his/her appointment to the  CEO position, and information on the compensation of executive 
directors other than CEO. All variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Tables 2 and 3 
give sample calculation examples for Board Busyness and CPS respectively.  
*****Insert Tables 1, 2 & 3 here***** 
 
3.2. Data description and summary statistics 
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We report summary statistics in Table 4[6]. We separate data into variables describing firm 
performance (Panel A); compensation, director characteristics and board structure (Panel B); 
and other firm characteristics (Panel C). The average CEO pay slice (CPS) based on the total 
compensation of up to top five executives including CEO is 45.22%, with minimum 0 and 
maximum 100%. The boards in our sample have on average 7 directors with minimum 3 
directors and maximum 14 directors. The average proportion of executive directors at the 
board level (Board Composition) is 48.44% with minimum of 13.51% and maximum 80% of 
executives at the board. The average CEO tenure is 4.44 years in our sample companies, with 
minimum 0 and maximum 24.70 years. 57.81% of companies in our sample have CEOs, who 
were not employees of the company before (Outside CEO).  
Firm size is, on average 4.35. The leverage level is 17.70% in the average company, 
with maximum leverage standing at 95%, and minimum leverage equals to 0%. Company age 
is, on average, 13.78 years, with the oldest company being in existence for 45 years, and the 
youngest company in our sample being just 0.34 years old. The maximum (minimum) ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets is 0.34 (0), with the average being 0.05. The average 
Tobin’s Q is 2.55, with maximum (minimum) Q equals to 20 (1.50).  
 
*******Insert Table 4 here ******* 
 
Table 5 reports CPS descriptive statistics. The statistics are presented for each year 
separately, along with statistics for two sub-samples, before and after year 2002[7]. On 
average, CPS has been growing over the 1997-2010 period. This is consistent with the 
evidence from the literature that proportion of compensation received by CEO has been on an 
upwards trend over time (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005; Frydman and 
                                                          
vi. All variables are winzorized to the 1st/99th percentiles. 
vii. In 2002, the UK was the forerunner in mandating that shareholders be allowed a non-binding, or 
advisory vote on executives’ pay (“say on pay”). 
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Saks, 2010). Introduction of advisory “say on pay” law in 2002 has not changed this 
increasing trend. In particular, mean CPS has been increasing gradually, from 32% in the 
year 1997 to 50% in year 2010, with an average CPS around 40% before the introduction of 
“say on pay”, i.e. before 2002, and average CPS around 47% upon implementation of this 
law, i.e. from year 2003 onwards.  This is in agreement with results in Ferri and Maber 
(2013) who find that introduction of “say on pay” has a limited effect on the levels of CEO 
compensation. 
*****Insert Table 5 here ***** 
 
 
4. Methodology  
In this section, we examine the effect of CPS on company performance. We follow the 
literature that relates firm performance to various corporate governance characteristics and 
use Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance (see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Gompers et al., 2003).  The CPS definition 
is adopted from Bebchuk et al.  (2011) with a minor modification, which was necessary due 
to the difference in board sizes in the UK and US[8]. 
We include control variables that have been considered important in the previous 
literature (see Bebchuk et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2013; Zalewska, 2014a). We include 
Board Composition, which is a proportion of executive directors at the board level. 
Considering the nature of data available and difficulties with identifying independent 
directors, we use Board Composition measure as a proxy for board independence (a lower 
proportion of executive directors at the board level is associated with higher level of board 
independence). Previous academic research finds board independence important in designing 
                                                          
viii. See Section 3.1 for the definition of CPS. 
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a CEO compensation plan (see Mehran, 1995; Ozerturk, 2005). We also control for board 
size and include natural logarithm of a total number of directors at the board level (Board 
Size). Academics provide controversial evidence on the relation between board size and 
company performance, with some documenting positive (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Dalton et 
al., 1998; Jackling and Johl, 2009), while others reporting negative association (Yermack, 
1996; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). In addition, we control for board busyness and 
include Busy Board variable, defined as a proportion of busy directors (directors with three or 
more directorships) at the board level. Core et al., (1999), and Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) suggest that directors can become overcommitted when serving on multiple boards, 
rendering them unable to provide meaningful managerial monitoring. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006), Jiraporn et al. (2006), and Jiraporn et al.  (2008) argue that boards with busy directors 
are associated with lax corporate governance and lower firm value. We also include a 
variable indicating that CEO and Chairman is the same person (Duality). We consider CEO 
Tenure as explanatory variable in our models. Bebchuk et al.  (2011) suggest that CEO tenure 
impacts on firm performance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that CEO propensity to 
employ more allies to the board will increase with his/her tenure, thereby increasing the CEO 
bargaining power. In line with Bebchuk et al.  (2011), and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) we 
also consider a CEO outsider variable. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) document that CEO-
outsider receives higher compensation resulting in higher level of CPS, which could be an 
indication of his/her unique skills and not necessarily agency problems.  
It is important to recognise that CPS could be endogenously determined, i.e. affected 
by the factors that are also affect firm performance. To account for this, we use fixed effects 
models, which consider how changes in CPS are associated with changes in firm value 
(Model 1) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡̃ = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖?̃? + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡̃ + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡̃ +  𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡̃ +
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𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡̃ + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +̃ 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  ̃ + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡̃ +
𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 ̃ + 𝛽10𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦_𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 ̃ + + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
13
𝑗=2  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (1) 
 
where the ~ (tilde) defines demeaned variables, and Performanceit  is our performance 
measure, i.e. Tobin’s Q. All other variable definitions are in Table 1. 
We ran fixed effects models with robust standard errors and robust standard errors 
clustered by industry. We also use fixed effect models with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard 
errors, which are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. We 
also use industry-adjusted CPS in each firm’s industry at the same FTAG3 level in the same 
year. In addition, we examine whether our results are robust to alternative specification of 
CPS based on the total compensation of a maximum of three (rather than five) executive 
directors (CPS 3 directors).  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 6 presents univariate comparison of key descriptive variables by CPS quartiles. Firms 
with high CPS appear to differ significantly from those with low CPS. Tobin’s Q declines as 
CPS increases. It declines in the second and third quartiles (as predicted by the agency and 
social comparison arguments) and then increases in the fourth quartile again.  The firms with 
highest CPS are smaller than those with the lowest CPS. Firms in the first quartile of CPS are 
younger than the firms in the fourth quartile. The univariate relation between CPS and Capex 
is not monotonic. Firms in the first three CPS quartiles have similar Capex, but firms in the 
fourth quartile have lower Capex. Leverage increases from the first to the fourth quartile of 
CPS. Firms with highest CPS have the busiest boards. Board size declines monotonically 
from the first to the fourth quartile of CPS. Board composition changes in line with the board 
size and declining monotonically from the first to the fourth quartile, which is consistent with 
13 
 
the view that CEO can entrench himself/herself, extract rents and increase agency costs, if 
board is less independent. Proportion of ‘outside’ CEOs increases gradually from the first to 
the fourth quartile suggesting that such directors are more valuable assets for companies.  
 
********Insert Table 6 here******* 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
In this section we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between 
CPS and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. The regression results are reported in Table 7. 
We separately report estimation results using fixed effects models with White (Panel A), 
robust clustered by industry (Panel B), and Driscoll–Kraay (1988) (Panel C) standard errors 
correction methods. Our main model is Model 1, with Tobin’s Q being regressed against CPS 
and our selected firm and governance control variables. We find that CPS coefficients are 
negative and significant (at the 1% level in Panel A and Panel B, and at the 10% in Panel C). 
In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation change in CPS is associated with a 
reduction in Tobin’s Q by 11.91%.  
We consider industry-adjusted CPS[9]  (Model 2) and CPS computed using total 
compensation of maximum three executive directors (Model 3). The results remain robust to 
these alternative specifications with negative and statistically significant CPS coefficients. 
These results are consistent with the view that high CPS adversely affects firm performance, 
supporting social comparison argument and Hypothesis 2. Our results are in line with results 
reported in the literature starting with Hicks (1963), who introduced the notion that large pay 
disparity may have a negative impact on employees through feeling of inequality and leads to 
a weaker dedication, diminishing efficiency of a team. Our results are in agreement with 
                                                          
ix. The industry adjustment is made by subtracting industry mean CPS (at the same FTAG3 level) from 
firm CPS in the same year 
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findings in Bebchuk et al.  (2011), Correa and Lel (2014), and Zalewska (2014a), who argue 
that a wide remuneration gap among executives affects firm outcomes in a negative way. 
Throughout our analysis we were not able to find support for the optimal selection argument 
(Hypothesis 1). Considering that UK boards are not strongly hierarchical (see Zalewska, 
2014a, 2014b), our results suggest that “tournament incentives” are ineffective in British 
companies.  
Examining control variables in the regressions, we find some interesting results. One 
of our corporate governance characteristics, Board size, has coefficients that are negative and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level), supporting the view that small boards are more 
efficient and perform better than their large counterparts when it comes to managing 
company performance. Both company size and capital expenditure coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that bigger companies and those with 
higher capital expenditure levels perform better. We also find positive relationship between 
leverage and Tobin’s Q. These findings are in line with findings in previous literature (see 
Bebchuk et al , 2011; McNulty et al., 2013; Zalewska, 2014a).  
 
********Insert Table 7 here******* 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate how CPS, the proportion of maximum top-five executive 
directors’ aggregate compensation captured by CEO, affects firm performance. We offer new 
insights into the pay inequality - performance relationship by evaluating three different 
arguments that are prevalent in the finance and management literature. One view claims that 
high CPS level distinguishes a company’s CEO and helps to create a good competition spirit 
within the board room resulting in better corporate performance. However, two other views 
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suggest exactly opposite: high CPS can be an indicator of agency problems in a company in 
which a powerful CEO extracts unjustified rents (agency argument), and could harm board 
effectiveness by impairing team cohesiveness and motivation (social comparison argument), 
in either case resulting in poor corporate performance  
Our analysis reveals a negative association between CPS and corporate performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. This evidence supports both the agency and social comparison 
arguments. The results of our study are robust for controlling for various firm, board and 
CEO characteristics. Our results are also robust to the different specifications of CPS. Our 
findings are in line with Bebchuk et al.  (2011) and Correa and Lel (2014). However, this is 
the one of the first studies that we are aware of, which investigates the CPS – performance 
relationship using the broad sample of UK-based companies[10]. We find that results from 
the UK sample are similar to those from studies on US companies. However, the underlying 
reason for the negative relationship between CPS and firm performance could differ between 
the UK and US contexts. Considering the specificity of UK corporate boards (see Zalewska, 
2014a,b), it is natural to put forward the social comparison argument as an important reason 
for the negative associations between CPS and firm performance[11].  
Given the changes in remuneration practices introduced by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) and the “say on pay” legislation (2013), we argue that CPS is an 
important aspect of firm governance and management that deserves attention of researchers 
and policy makers. The fact that high CPS negatively impacts on firm performance has strong 
implications for the on-going debate on how to reform executive remuneration so that it 
                                                          
x. Forbes, Pogue and Hodgkinson (2014) use smaller sample of companies, considering firms from the 
UK FTSE 100 index in their study of CPS-performance relationship. 
xi. UK companies are generally characterised by high corporate governance standards, but agency 
problems may still exist in some companies. However, considering the attention the business 
community has given to the issue, and the recommendations provided by the most recent   UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010), it is natural to assume that agency conflicts would be minimal, 
and that the social comparison argument is more likely to explain the negative CPS – performance 
relationship.  
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provides the right incentives. It highlights the importance of considering remuneration issues 
at the board rather than at the CEO or at the sectoral or industry levels, and supports the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles[12]. UK corporate governance reforms move 
towards increasing board’s responsibilities for company’s performance, and it is important to 
consider board-wide remuneration issues without narrowing them down simply to the details 
of CEO compensation.  
                                                          
xii. “The performance-related elements of executive remuneration… should be sensitive to pay and 
employment conditions elsewhere in the group” (Supporting principle, Section D: Remuneration, The 
UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010: p. 22).  
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
The data variables refer to the corresponding compensation and corporate governance variable identifiers in the 
BoardEx annual database and to the corresponding performance and firm characteristics variables identifiers in 
the Tomson Datastream database. 
Variable Definition 
 
Compensation 
 
CEO pay slice (CPS) 
 
 
 
The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and 
maximum top-five executives, including CEO that is received by the CEO. 
 
 
CEO pay slice (CPS), 
3 directors 
 
The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and 
maximum top-three executives, including CEO that is received by the CEO. 
 
5 
Corporate Governance  
 
 
Board busyness The proportion of busy directors at the board level. Busy directors are defined 
as directors holding three or more directorships, including the “home” 
company, in the public companies at the same time. 
 
Board composition The proportion of executive directors on the board. Total number of 
supervisory directors divided by the total number of all directors on the board. 
 
  
Board size The natural logarithm of the total number of all directors on the board. 
 
CEO tenure The   number of years directors have served on the board 
 
Duality Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Chairman is the same person 
 
CEO outsider CEO Outsider is a dummy equal to one, if CEO was working at the firm for 
less than one year before becoming CEO. 
 
  
Performance measure 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
(Book value of assets – book value of common equity – balance sheet differed 
taxes + market value of equity)/book value of total assets: (WC02999– 
WC03501 – WC03263 + MV)/ WC02999 
 
 
F5irm characteristics 
 
 
Size Natural logarithm of  market value: Ln (MV) 
 
Leverage Total debt/total assets WC03255/ WC02999 
 
  
Capital expenditures 
 
 
Company age 
 
 
 
Capital expenditures/ total assets: WC04601/ WC02999 
 
 
Number of years since company’s information is available on Thomson 
Datastream: BDATE 
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Table 2 
Calculation of CPS variables 
This is an example calculation for our measures of CEO pay slice (CPS) using BoardEx database data for the 
AEGIS GROUP PLC (ISIN GB00B4JV1B90) for the year 1997. Total compensation is a total compensation 
including salary, bonuses, and equity-based compensation per executive director.  The Rank is an executives’ 
rank by total compensation. The proportion of CEO compensation to the total compensation of total five 
executives including CEO (CPS) is the total compensation of CEO to the sum of total compensations of top five 
executives..  
Director Rank Total Compensation 
Sir Crispin Henry Davis (CEO) 1 971 
Kai  Hiemstra 2 793 
Eryck  Rebbouh 3 483 
Bruno  Kemoun 4 476 
Colin Richard Day 5 432 
Raymond (Ray) F Kelly 6 341 
   
   
   
   
Total Compensation of top five executives  3,155 
Tot5al CEO Compensation  971 
CPS  971/3,155=0.3078 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Calculation of Board Busyness variables 
This is an example calculation for our measures of director busyness using BoardEx database data for the 
SAFEWAY PLC (ISIN GB0000492412) for the year 1997. Total number of directorships counts the number of 
directorships (total number of current quoted boards including the “home” company) held by all directors 
serving on the board. Directorships per director are estimated as the total number of directorships held by the 
directors of the board divided by board size. The proportion of busy directors (Board Busyness) is the number of 
directors holding three or more board seats divided by board size.  
Director Total Directorships 
Colin Deverell Smith 1 
David Gordon Webster 3 
Gordon  Wotherspoon 1 
Patricia (Pat) Anne O'Driscoll 1 
Robert George Charters 1 
Simon Timothy Laffin 1 
Sir Alistair  Grant 4 
Doctor Neville Clifford Bain 4 
Jul5ia Ann Burdus 4 
Michael John Allen 
 
 
2 
Total Directorships 22 
Directorships per Director 22/10 = 2.2 
Proportion with three or more directorships 4/10 = 0.4 (40%) 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 7660 firm-year observations for years from 1997 to 
2010, excluding financial firms. All variables are winzorized to the 1st /99th percentiles. All variable 
d5efinitions are in the Table 1.  
 
Mean Minimum Maximum Observations 
 
Panel A: Performance Measure 
    
 
Tobin’s Q 
  
2.55 
 
0.00 
 
20.00 
 
7649 
     
 
Panel B: Compensation/Director/Board characteristics 
    
 
CPS 
 
0.45 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
7028 
Board composition 0.48 0.20 0.80 7649 
Board busyness 0.17 0.00 0.67 7649 
Board size 1.90 1.10 2.64 7649 
Board duality 0.09 0.00 1.00 7649 
CEO tenure 4.44 0.00 24.40 7649 
CEO outsider 0.58 0.00 1.00 7649 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
    
 
Size 
 
4.36 
 
-0.22 
 
9.83 
 
7576 
Company Age 13.78 0.34 45.03 7579 
Capex/Total Assets 0.05 0.00 0.34 7631 
Leverage 0.18 0.00 0.95 7648 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics on CEO pay slice (CPS) compensation  
This table presents descriptive statistics (mean, median, maximum and minimum CPS for our sample firms over the period 1997-2010.  
 
CPS Descriptive Statistics 
YEAR  
 Before SoP After SoP  
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(1997 
-2002) 
(2003 
-2010) 
t-stat 
(p-val) 
 Mean 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.47 
 
 Median 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.37 0.46 
 
 Maximum 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Observations 37 50 230 351 440 494 560 641 733 819 769 674 612 618 1602 5426 
  
Difference of CPS means 
(before and after SoP) 
                 
12.03 
(0.00) 
 
 
Table 6 
Firm characteristics by CPS quartiles 
This table presents univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of corporate governance and firm 
characteristics of 7649 firm years from the 1997-2010 sample of UK-based publicly traded firms, excluding 
financial firms. The director and board data is from the BoardEx database, firm data is from Tomson 
Datastream. CEO pay slice (CPS) is the fraction of total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and 
maximum top-five executive directors including CEO that is received by CEO. Other variables definitions are in 
the Table 1. The table displays the means and medians (in parentheses) of various director, board, and firm 
characteristics for first, second, third, and fourth quartiles of CPS.  The t-statistics is for a difference of means 
test from the first to the forth quartile of CPS. Each quartile contains approximately 1780 firm -years. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
First  
quartile 
Second  
quartile 
Third  
quartile 
Fourth  
quartile 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
 
CPS characteristics    
CPS range 0.00 to 0.0.32 0.32 to 0.44 0.44 to 0.0.58 0.58 to 1.00   
CPS 0.22 
(0.25) 
0.37 
(0.37) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.70 
(0.65) 
127.94*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
CPS, 3 directors 0.22 
(0.30) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
0.52 
(0.52) 
0.70 
(0.66) 
104.64*** 
(0.000) 
 
Performance       
Tobin’s Q 2.55 
(1.51) 
2.49 
(1.50) 
2.41 
(1.47) 
2.47 
(1.50) 
-0.72*** 
(0.469) 
 
 
Director/board 
characteristics 
      
Board busyness 0.15 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
7.48*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Board composition 0.56  
(0.57) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.45 
(0.43) 
0.39 
(0.40) 
-41.00*** 
(0.075) 
 
 
Board size 8.00 
(8.00) 
7.62 
(7.00) 
6.69 
(6.00) 
6.25 
(6.00) 
-23.67*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Duality 0.12 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
-6.39*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
CEO tenure 4.44 
(2.90) 
4.94 
(3.30) 
4.58 
(2.90) 
3.91 
(2.80) 
-3.43*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
CEO outsider 
 
0.49 
(0.00) 
0.52 
(1.00) 
0.59 
(1.00) 
0.65 
(1.00) 
8.74*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Firm characteristics       
Size 4.60 
(4.50) 
4.83 
(4.76) 
4.33 
(4.14) 
4.28 
(4.13) 
-4.04*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Company age 13.75 
(8.69) 
14.36 
(9.82) 
14.27 
(9.46) 
14.87 
(8.65) 
2.41** 
(0.016) 
 
 
Capex 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-5.11*** 
(0.000) 
 
Leverage  0.17 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.13) 
1.62 
(0.1063) 
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Table 7 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) and Firm Performance 
This table reports results from an analysis of corporate performance measured by Tobin’s Q in our sample of firms from 1997 to 2010.    
Panel A shows the regression results obtained by using fixed effects models with year dummy variables (not shown) and t-statistic based on 
White’s standard errors.  Panel B shows the regression results obtained by using fixed effects models with year dummy variables (not 
shown)  and t-statistics based on the robust standard errors clustered by industry (we use FTAG3 index as an industry identifier). Panel C 
shows the regression results obtained by using fixed effects models with t-statistics based on Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of maximum top five executives’ total 
compensation and is expressed as decimals. CPS 3 directors is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of maximum top three 
executives’ total compensation and is expressed as decimals. CPS adjusted is industry-adjusted CPS. The industry adjustment is made by 
subtracting industry mean CPS (at the same FTAG3 level) from firm CPS in the same year. All other variable definitions are in Appendix 1. 
Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Fixed effects model with White’s corrected standard errors 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) -0.6182*** 
(0.2052) 
  
CPS adjusted 
 
 -0.6533*** 
(0.2043) 
 
CPS, 3 directors 
 
  -0.5308*** 
(0.1780) 
Board busyness -0.4887 
(0.2758) 
-0.4890 
 (0.2758) 
-0.5139 
(0.2770) 
Board composition
 
-0.0740 
(0.3934) 
-0.0816 
(0.3914) 
-0.0601 
(0.3826) 
Board size -1.6531*** 
(0.1879) 
-1.6562*** 
(0.1871) 
-1.5946*** 
(0.1839) 
Duality -0.1126 
(0.1603) 
-0.1131  
(0.1603) 
-0.1168 
(0.1613) 
CEO tenure -0.0102 
(0.0098) 
-0.0103 
(0.0098) 
-0.0090 
(0.0010) 
CEO outsider 0.1036 
(0.0928) 
0.1032 
(0.0928) 
0.0923 
(0.0933) 
Size 1.0090*** 
(0.0422) 
1.0090*** 
(0.0422) 
1.0200*** 
(0.0424) 
Company age 
 
-0.1729 
(0.3178) 
-0.1647 
(0.3178) 
-0.2059 
(0.3187) 
Capex 2.3249*** 
(0.6901) 
1.3160*** 
(0.6901) 
2.4900*** 
(0.6922) 
Leverage 1.6539*** 
(0.2558) 
1.1655*** 
(0.2526) 
1.7047*** 
(0.2565) 
Constant  3.4210 
(2.0519) 
3.4210 
(2.0048) 
3.3691 
(2.0319) 
Year dummy 
R
2 
 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Number of observations 6959 6959 6959 
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Table 7 (cont) 
 
Panel B: Fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered by industry FTAG3 code 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) -0.6182*** 
(0.2161) 
  
CPS adjusted 
 
 -0.6533*** 
(0.2043) 
 
CPS, 3 directors 
 
  -0.5308*** 
(0.1783) 
Board busyness -0.4887 
(0.4485) 
-0.4890 
 (0.24472) 
-0.5139 
(0.4523) 
Board composition
 
-0.0740 
(0.4060) 
-0.0103 
(0.0116) 
-0.0601 
(0.3997) 
Board size -1.6531*** 
(0.3478) 
-1.6562*** 
(0.3522) 
-1.5946*** 
(0.3427) 
Duality -0.1126 
(0.2364) 
-0.1131  
(0.2371) 
-0.1168 
(0.2359) 
CEO tenure -0.0102 
(0.0116) 
-0.0103 
(0.0116) 
-0.0090 
(0.0117) 
CEO outsider 0.1036 
(0.1305) 
0.1032 
(0.1307) 
0.0923 
(0.1260) 
Size 1.0090*** 
(0.1361) 
1.0090*** 
(0.1363) 
1.0200*** 
(0.1352) 
Company age 
 
-0.1729 
(0.2990) 
-0.1647 
(0.2942) 
-0.2059 
(0.3083) 
Capex 2.3249 
(1.4852) 
2.3160 
(1.4854) 
2.4900 
(1.4715) 
Leverage 1.6539* 
(0.8179) 
1.6582* 
(0.8164) 
1.7047* 
(0.8095) 
Constant  3.4210 
(2.0048) 
3.1849 
(1.9676) 
3.3691 
(2.0701) 
Year dummy 
R
2 
 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Yes 
0.16 
Number of observations 6959 6959 6959 
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Table 7 (cont)  
Panel C: Fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) -0.6244* 
(0.3204) 
  
CPS adjusted 
 
 -0.6703* 
(0.3211) 
 
CPS, 3 directors 
 
  -0.5939** 
(0.2634) 
Board busyness -0.5411 
(0.4922) 
-0.5411 
 (0.4932) 
-0.5615 
(0.5055) 
Board composition
 
-0.0929 
(0.3481) 
-0.1071 
(0.3414) 
-0.0163 
(0.3044) 
Board size -1.7414*** 
(0.2964) 
-1.7458*** 
(0.2952) 
-1.6928*** 
(0.2853) 
Duality -0.1250 
(0.1808) 
-0.1261  
(0.1808) 
-0.1303 
(0.1768) 
CEO tenure -0.0058 
(0.0049) 
-0.0059 
(0.0049) 
-0.0045 
(0.0047) 
CEO outsider 0.1042 
(0.0800) 
0.1036 
(0.0800) 
0.0923 
(0.0776) 
Size 1.0508*** 
(0.1421) 
1.0497*** 
(0.1422) 
1.0606*** 
(0.1410) 
Company age 
 
-0.1341 
(0.0244) 
-0.1427 
(0.0263) 
-0.1355 
(0.0244) 
Capex 2.2312*** 
(0.7026) 
2.2229*** 
(0.6984) 
2.3976*** 
(0.7371) 
Leverage 1.5692*** 
(0.3487) 
1.5725*** 
(0.3478) 
1.6175*** 
(0.3349) 
Constant  2.8560 
(0.8542) 
2.7248 
(0.7756) 
2.6701 
(0.7773) 
Year dummy 
R
2 
 
No  
0.15 
No  
0.15 
No  
0.15 
Number of observations 6959 6959 6959 
 
 
 
